KADIC V KARADZIC: DO PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS HAVE ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ALIEN
TORT CLAIMS ACT?
I. INTRODUCTION
As part of a growing trend of litigating international human rights
offenses in U.S. federal courts, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in Kadic v. Karadzic' that jurisdiction existed over
Radovan Karadzic, President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb
republic of Srpska, for a civil action based on human rights violations
in the former Yugoslavia.' As the commander of Bosnian-Serb
military forces, Karadzic is alleged to have been responsible for a
pattern of systematic human rights violations, including acts of rape,
torture, extrajudicial killing, and genocide.3 In seeking punishment
and compensation, the survivors of these atrocities filed suit in a
federal district court, which dismissed their case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.4 The Second Circuit, however, subsequently
reversed the district court, holding that the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA)5 provides U.S. federal courts with jurisdiction over international human rights violations such as those allegedly perpetrated by
Karadzic.6 Although the Second Circuit's finding of jurisdiction raises
two controversial issues regarding the obligations and the rights of the
individual under international law, the court was justified in holding
that federal courts have jurisdiction over the claims brought against
Radovan Karadzic.
Initially, the idea of a federal court claiming jurisdiction in a
dispute between two alien parties based upon injuries inflicted outside
of the United States may come as a surprise.7 The Karadzic court,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ATCA,

70 F.3d 232 (2nd. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 236.
Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
See Id.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 1993). For a discussion of the history and application of the
see infra part II.C.

6. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 236.

7. Chief Judge Newman even began his opinion by noting that "most Americans would
probably be surprised to learn that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader
of the insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in Manhattan." Karadzic,
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however, is not alone in its undertaking. Beginning with the watershed Filartigadecision in 1980,8 U.S. federal courts have begun to
exercise jurisdiction over certain individuals who come within the
scope of the ATCA through violations of the "law of nations."9 In
Filartiga, for example, the Second Circuit found that jurisdiction
existed because the defendant had violated the law of nations by
engaging in official torture." While the court held that an individual
could be liable for violations of the law of nations, it also made it clear
that such liability was possible only if the individual perpetrator was
a "state official."" In dealing with the claim against Radovan
Karadzic, however, the Second Circuit specifically recognized that the
law of nations can be violated by private individuals (i.e., non-state
actors).' Thus, the Second Circuit's decision in Karadzic seems to
depart substantially from its holding in Filartiga,inasmuch as the court
openly exercises jurisdiction over a non-state actor.
Karadzic, however, raises an even more remarkable issue
regarding the power of the individual to enforce rights under
international law. As a general rule, individuals are deemed to have
no ability to enforce their rights under international law.13 For
example, an influential opinion by a D.C. Circuit judge questioned
whether the ATCA allowed private individuals to bring suit based on
violations of international law, where no private right of action was
provided by international law.'4 Karadzic, however, did not address

70 F.3d at 236.
8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980).
9. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
10. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880.
11. Id.
12. Karadzic,70 F.3d at 239. Responding to the district court, the Second Circuit declared,
"We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modem era, confines its reach
to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether
undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals." Id.
13. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
14. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 820 (D.C. Cir., 1984) (J. Bork,
concurring) ("'[S]ection 1350 opens the federal courts for adjudication of rights already
recognized by international law' but only when among those rights is that of individuals to
enforce substantive rules in municipal courts.") (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777 (J. Edwards
concurring)).
Although the Tel-Oren court unanimously affirmed the lower court, each of the three judges
(Edwards, Bork, and Robb) wrote a separate concurring opinion setting forth his different
reasons for affirming. This Note refers only to the opinions of Edwards and Bork, both of which
raise issues that are important to the analysis of Karadzic. Special attention is given to the
opinion of Judge Bork, which is considered to be the more influential and perhaps the more
threatening to the modem usage of the ATCA. See Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren
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this seemingly crucial issue. Instead, the Second Circuit assumed, as
in Filartiga,that the ATCA not only provided jurisdiction but also
created a private cause of action for a violation of the law of nations.
Thus, Karadzic is a noteworthy statement regarding the nature of the
individual in international law in two respects: it specifically holds
that an individual non-state actor can be bound by the obligations of
international law," and it allows a private individual to assert her
6
rights under the ATCA based on a violation of international law.
II. THE STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Historically, the status of the individual under international law
has been a subject of considerable dispute.'7 A consensus view
finally emerged during the nineteenth century, however, with the rise
of the classical theory of international law. 8 One of the defining
features of classical international law is its "predominately statist"
nature. 9 According to this view, international law deals solely with
the relationships among states, without regard for either the obligations or the rights of the individual.'
A. Individual Obligations Under International Law
The classical theory, however, has not always dominated the law
of nations. Indeed, prior to the nineteenth century, many prominent
legal scholars agreed that individuals were important personalities in
the realm of international law.' According to Grotius, the law of

Tell Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985) (describing Bork's opinion as the most detailed and
perhaps the most scholarly in Tel-Oren).
15. Karadzic,70 F.3d at 239.
16. Id.at 232.
17. See Jay M.L. Humphrey, A Legal Lohengrin:FederalJurisdictionUnder The Alien Tort
Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 112 n.52 (1979) ("Today, the relationship of the
individual to international law is unclear.").
18. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartigav. Pena-Irala 22 HARV.INT'L
L.J. 53, 64 (1981).
19. See id. (noting that the classical system "incorporates a predominantly statist view of
international law").
20. See CARL A. NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL ININTERNATIONAL LAW
11 (1962)(stating that under the classical theory, "states were the sole subjects of international
law, whereas no direct relation between that law and individuals existed").
21. See, eg., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794. But compare Vattel, who concluded that individuals
as a class, had no place in the sphere of international law. PETER P. REMEC, TiE PosITIoN OF
THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO GRoTIus AND VATTEL 157-82
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nations pertained not so much to the interactions among states as to
Similarly, Pufendorf
the international activities of individuals.'
characterized the law of nations as a natural law which bound states
and individuals alike.' Blackstone also catalogued offenses against
the law of nations which were punishable when committed by private
persons.24
The views of these scholars are buttressed by ancient examples of
individual violations of the law of nations, many of which occurred
under the theory of hostis humani generis, a Roman phrase meaning
"enemies of mankind."' As a doctrine, hostis humani generis stood
for the principle that "certain acts specified as universally reprehensible would make the perpetrator liable to capture and trial wherever
he went."26 In practice, this doctrine reached two groups of perpetrators: pirates and slave traders.27 Despite its limited application, the
hostis humani generis doctrine had profound implications for international law in that it held individuals liable, both civilly and criminally,
for violations of the law of nations.' Although the prominence of
hostis humani generis faded with the rise of the classical theory in the
nineteenth century, the doctrine set an important precedent through
its use of international law in holding individuals liable for universally
condemned acts.29
B. Individual Rights Under International Law
Whereas the existence of individual obligations under international law is open to debate, there is a substantial consensus that
international law does not allow the assertion of individual rights. As
one commentator concludes, "the right of individuals to proceed
before international bodies is almost non-existent today in international law practice."3 This is a proposition on which nearly all commen-

(1960).
22. Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the InternationalPersonalityof Individuals,50 AM.
J.INT'L L 533, 534 (1956).
23. Id.
24. See 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 66-73 (Welsby ed. 1854).
25. See, eg., United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210,232 (1849).
26. United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820), quoted in Blum & Steinhardt,
supra note 18, at 60.
27. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 18, at 60.
28. Id. at 61.

29. The hostis humanigenerisdoctrine was especially prominent at the end of the eighteenth
century, contemporaneous with the creation of the ATCA. See id. at 60; 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
30. St. Korowicz, supra note 22, at 561.
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tators agree.3 ' Still, despite scholarly agreement that the individual
has no general claim to rights under international law, individuals have
often asserted rights based on international law by using the ATCA.
C. The Individual Under the ATCA
Although private suits based on international law have hardly
been the historical norm, such suits are explicitly allowed by the text
of the ATCA itself:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed 3in
2 violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.

As this language indicates, the ATCA grants jurisdiction to federal
courts only if: (1) the action is brought by an alien, (2) the suit is for
a "tort only," and (3) there has been a violation of the "law of
nations" or a "treaty of the United States., 33 To be precise about
the mechanism of the statute, it is the violation of international law
(i.e., the "law of nations" or a "treaty of the United States") that
triggers the ATCA, which in turn provides federal district courts with
jurisdiction.34
Some difficulty has arisen, however, in construing the meaning of
"a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations."3 s The
main issue is whether the ATCA actually creates a cause of action or
36
merely provides jurisdiction for a cause of action that already exists.

31. See NORGAARD, supra note 20, at 98 ("the individual has not universally been made a
subject of rights under international law with respect to fundamental human rights"); W. PAUL
GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDuAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND

SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 185 (the individual has yet to achieve a locus standi equal to that
possessed by states). But cf Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 543, 611-28 (1989).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Debra A. Harvey, The Alien Tort Statute: InternationalHuman Rights Watchdog
or Simply "HistoricalTrivia"?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341 (1988).
35. See Humphrey, supranote 17, at 110 (explaining the confusion over the use of the term
"tort" in the ATCA).
36. See id. One problem in resolving this issue is that clear authority for both points of view
exists. On one hand, a 1907 Opinion of the Attorney General interpreted the ATCA as providing both jurisdiction and a cause of action. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250,252-53 (1907). On the other
hand, the Second Circuit held in 1976 that the ATCA did not create a cause of action, at least
where the suit was based upon the violation of a treaty. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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One reason for this confusion about the ATCA is the lack of
information surrounding its original purpose.3 7 Although the ATCA
has the distinction of being part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, it

has virtually no recorded legislative history.3" To counter this lack
of legislative history, legal scholars have examined the ideological
climate surrounding the creation of the ATCA in order to extrapolate
its underlying rationale. 9
Several scholars have concluded that Congress' rationale in
establishing the ATCA was to avoid crises in foreign relations by
providing a forum for aliens to obtain redress for civil wrongs caused
by a violation of international law.40 At the time of the passage of
the ATCA, Congress was concerned that the United States government might be held accountable by foreign governments for civil
wrongs committed against their citizens by citizens of the United
States.4 ' Because lack of a forum might have been perceived as a
denial of justice and an affront to the sovereignty of the foreign
nation, Congress probably enacted the ATCA to provide a forum in
which the injured alien could seek relief, thereby avoiding an
international conflict.42
In addition to explaining the existence of the ATCA, this
rationale also explains why ATCA cases have often recognized that
individuals should be considered subjects of international law. For
example, in order to successfully deter foreign relations conflicts, the
ATCA was often used to resolve disputes between the citizens of
foreign countries and the citizens of the United States.43 As one
commentator notes, these disputes sometimes involved "a private
wrong by one person to an individual alien."' In order for jurisdiction to exist under the ATCA in such disputes, the courts had to
recognize two principles: first, that the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States could be violated, and the ATCA triggered, by "one

This issue is analyzed in detail by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798823.
37. Because of the nebulous origin and purpose of the ATCA, it has been dubbed a "legal
Lohengrin," named after a mysterious character in a Wagner opera. See, e.g., lIT v. Vancap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
38. Harvey, supra note 34, at 342 n.7 and accompanying text.
39. Id. at 342.
40. See Humphrey, supra note 17, at 113; Harvey, supranote 34, at 343, 344.
41. Harvey, supra note 34, at 343.
42. Humphrey, supra note 17, at 113.
43. See id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).

1996]

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT

325

person;" second, that such a violation could be the basis of a suit by
an "individual alien." As the judicial history of the ATCA demonstrates, courts construing the ATCA have frequently recognized both
of these principles, thereby acknowledging that individuals have both
obligations and rights under international law.
1. Individual Obligations in ATCA Cases. Both early and
modern ATCA cases have recognized that the law of nations imposes
binding obligations upon individuals.45 Whether these obligations
extend to individuals who are non-state actors, however, remains a
point of dispute. In fact, some of the holdings of modern ATCA cases
have tried to limit individual liability to situations where an individual
qualifies as a state actor.
Early cases involving the ATCA are scarce. In fact, prior to the
twentieth century, there were only two reported decisions involving
47 held
the ATCA.46 Only one of these decisions, Bolchos v. Darrell,
that jurisdiction existed under the ATCA. In Bolchos, a Spanish ship
containing slaves was captured and taken to an American port.
Although the slaves were the "property" of a Spanish citizen, they had
been mortgaged to a British subject. Darrell, the agent of the British
subject, seized and sold the slaves in the United States, and was
subsequently sued by Bolchos, another party who claimed ownership
of the slaves. Using the ATCA to provide jurisdiction, the court held
that Darrell, a private individual, had violated rights that were
guaranteed to Bolchos by a treaty of the United States.4" This
holding demonstrated that the Bolchos court recognized not only that
indi(dual obligations existed under the law of nations, but also that
those obligations were enforceable under the ATCA.
After these early cases, the ATCA lay dormant for over a
hundred years, until the modern-era of ATCA jurisprudence began in
the twentieth century.49 One of the first modern cases, AbdulRahman Omar Adra v. Clift,50 held that the ATCA provided jurisdic-

45. See, eg., Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v.

Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Filartiga,630 F.2d 876.
46. See Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. 810; Moxon v. The Brigantine Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa.
1793).
47. 3 F. Cas. 810.
48. Id. at 810.
49. The reasons for this period of disuse are unclear. One commentator has explained the
lack of early ATCA cases as a result of political controversy that followed the enactment of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. See Humphrey, supra note 17, at 119.
50. 195 F. Supp. 857.
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tion where the law of nations had been violated by a private individual.5 ' Adra was somewhat unusual in that it involved a domestic
relations dispute.5 2 The Lebanese Ambassador to Iran sought to
obtain custody of his daughter from his ex-wife and her American
husband.53 The ambassador argued that jurisdiction should lie under
the ATCA because his ex-wife had falsified a passport in violation of
the law of nations.54 The court accepted this argument and held that
the ex-wife, a private individual, had violated the law of nations."
Whereas Adra only implied that an individual could violate the
law of nations, another court expressly stated that the ATCA could be
triggered where the law of nations had been violated by an individual.
In Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, the court declared that a
plaintiff would be entitled to jurisdiction under the ATCA only upon
a showing of the following:
[I]nter alia, at least a violation by one or more individuals of those
standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between
states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used56by
those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.
In promulgating this definition, the court must have believed that
ATCA jurisdiction could be invoked where the law of nations had
been violated by an individual.
Despite its long history, the ATCA only came to the forefront in
1980, when it emerged as a tool for bringing human rights violations
57 In Filartiga,citizens of
to federal court in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
Paraguay sued a former Paraguayan police official for the torture, and
subsequent death, of their son and brother.58 The Second Circuit
defined the threshold issue in the case as "whether the conduct alleged
violates the law of nations."59 After consulting with recognized
51. Id.at 859, 865.
52. Federal courts usually decline jurisdiction in cases involving domestic relations. Id. at
865.
53. See id. at 860-62.
54. Id. at 864-65. The court found a violation of the law of nations because the falsification
wronged the Lebanese Republic, which according to the court, "is entitled to control the issuance
of passports to its nationals." Id.at 865.
55. Id at 864-65.
56. Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (emphasis
added).
57. 630 F.2d 876.
58. Id. at 878.
59. Id. at 880.
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sources of international law, the court concluded that the police
official's alleged conduct did violate the law of nations, but only
because customary international law prohibited torture by an official
state actor.60
The court's holding had several important consequences for the
status of the individual under the law of nations. First, it supported
the general principle that individual obligations under the law of
nations were recognized for the purposes of ATCA cases. Second, the
holding highlighted the distinction between the two types of "individuals" recognized by international law: the individual state actor, and
the individual non-state actor. Under Filartiga, an individual could
violate the international law prohibition on torture only as an official
state actor.6 '
Filartiga'sstate-actor requirement was then applied in another
important ATCA case, Tel-Oren v. Lybian Arab Republic.62 In the
first part of the opinion, Judge Edwards recognized the Filartiga rule
but declined to extend it to individual non-state actors, on the grounds
that there was not yet enough international consensus to establish
torture by non-state actors as a violation of international law.63
Elsewhere in the opinion, however, Edwards asserts the broader
proposition that non-state actors cannot violate international law,
regardless of the substantive offense: "I do not believe that the law
of nations, as currently developed and construed, holds individuals
responsible for most private acts."'
Writing in a separate opinion,
Judge Bork echoed this characterization of the individual non-state
actor under the law of nations: "[I]nternational law imposes duties
only on states and on their agents or officials."'6 5 Although these
propositions seem strange in light of earlier ATCA cases involving
individual non-state actors,66 some courts, including the district court
6 7 have perceived them as a new
that originally dismissed Karadzic,
6
trend in modern ATCA cases."

60. Id. at 878, 884-85.
61. Id.

62. 726 F.2d at 791-93. In contrast with the result in Filartiga,Tel-Oren held that there was
no violation of the law of nations because the defendant was a non-state actor. See id. at 795.
63. Id.

64. Id. at 780 n.4.
65. Id. at 805-06.
66. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
67. 866 F. Supp. 734.
68. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that "only individuals who have acted under official
authority or under color of such authority may violate international law." In re Estate of Ferdin-
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2. Individual Rights in ATCA Cases. In the same way that
many ATCA cases have recognized that individuals have obligations
under international law, most ATCA cases have also recognized that
international law can give rise to individual substantive rights.
Although individual rights were not directly addressed in the early
ATCA cases, this issue has become a significant point of contention
in several modem ATCA decisions.
The very first of the early ATCA cases was Moxon v. The
Brigantine Fanny.69 In Moxon, British citizens sued for restitution
and damages under the ATCA when their ship was captured by the
French and taken to the port of Philadelphia." Though the suit was
dismissed on the grounds that there was no violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States, there was apparently no
dispute over the right of the British owners, as private individuals, to
bring the suit.7 ' Two years later, the right of individuals to bring suit
under the ATCA for violations of international law was reaffirmed in
72 In this case, the court sustained jurisdiction
Bolchos v. Darrell.
under the ATCA, and like the Moxon court, it never questioned the
ability of a private individual plaintiff to bring suit based on international law.73
Despite these historical examples, the use of the ATCA to
enforce substantive rights based on the law of nations became one of
the central points of dispute in Tel-Oren.74 In this landmark ATCA
case, Judge Bork set forth his view that even where a defendant has
admittedly violated the law of nations, the ATCA creates no private
right of action for an individual plaintiff where none had existed
previously in the law of nations.75 Although far from universally
accepted, Judge Bork's view regarding the scope of the ATCA has
been endorsed by other courts that have recently construed the

and E. Marcos Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1992).
Note that the approach taken in Tel-Oren is essentially a modem application of the classical
theory of international law, which restricted the scope of the law of nations to states and official
state actors. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
69. 17 F. Cas. 942.
70. Id. at 942-43.
71. See id. at 947-48.
72. 3 F. Cas. 810. For the factual background in Bolchos, see supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
73. See 3 F. Cas. 810.
74. 726 F.2d 774.
75. Id. at 799-801.
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statute. 6
On the other hand, many modem courts have allowed individual
plaintiffs to sue under the ATCA either by assuming or by explicitly
recognizing that the ATCA provides individuals with a private right
of action.77 Despite the obvious importance of the question of the
existence of a right of action, this issue often goes unaddressed, as was
the case in Karadzic.78
III. KADIC v. KARADZIC
While Karadzic may be controversial for its treatment of the
individual under international law, its gruesome facts demonstrate the
dire need for individual accountability under international law in
certain circumstances. Karadzic involves two actions brought by
plaintiffs S. Kadic and Jane Doe, on behalf of themselves and others
who alleged that they were victims of atrocious human rights
violations in the former Yugoslavia.79 Kadic and Doe alleged that
the defendant subjected them and others in the former Yugoslavia to
the following treatment: "genocide, rape, forced prostitution and
impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality, summary
execution, and wrongful death.""0 The plaintiffs claimed that
Karadzic, as the ultimate commander of the Bosnian-Serb military
forces, was8 responsible for all of these injuries that were inflicted by
his forces. '
These claims were rejected by the district court, which dismissed
both actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2 Specifically, the
court concluded that "acts committed by non-state actors do not
violate the law of nations."'
Because the court characterized

76. See, eg., Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 343, 348 (N.D.
Ohio 1989) ("Somewhere in the law of nations or in the treaties of the United States, the
plaintiff must discern and plead a cause of action that, if proved, would permit this Court to

grant relief").
77. See Filartiga,630 F.2d 876 (finding jurisdiction without addressing right of action); Paul
v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding both jurisdiction and right of action); Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (finding a consensus that the ATCA
provides not only jurisdiction but also a right of action).
78. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232.
79. Id. at 236-37.
80. Id. at 237.
81. Id.
82. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 735-36.

83. Id. at 739.
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Karadzic as a non-state actor,' there could be no violation of the law
of nations and therefore no jurisdiction under the ATCA.
The Second Circuit, however, reversed the district court, finding
that subject matter jurisdiction did exist under the ATCA.85 According to the Second Circuit, the only disputed issue before the court was
whether the plaintiffs had pleaded a violation of the law of nations by
the defendantY6 Assuming that the defendant qualified as a nonstate actor, the court found that the allegations of genocide and war
crimes, if shown to be true, constituted violations of the law of
nationsY7
In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit specifically held
that non-state actors were capable of violating international law.88
In so doing, the court cited a number of historical examples of international law violations by non-state actors and concluded that, in the
modem era of the law of nations, state action was not strictly required
in order to find a violation.8 9
In evaluating whether defendant Karadzic had violated the law of
nations in the present case, the court turned to those sources of the
law of nations referred to in Filartiga." According to Filartiga,
norms of contemporary international law are defined by "'consulting
the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."' 9' Looking to these sources of
the law of nations, the court found that private individuals could
violate the law of nations through the commission of either genocide
or war crimes.92

As to the issue of whether the law of nations provided private
individuals with substantive rights, however, the Second Circuit
remained surprisingly silent. In fact, no part of Karadzic addresses
84. Id. at 741 ("[T]his court finds that members of Karadzic's faction do not act under the
color of any recognized state law.").
85. Karadzic,70 F.3d at 236.
86. Id. at 238.
87. Id. at 241-43.
88. Id. at 239.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 238.
91. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,160-61

(1820)).
92. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240. "Individuals may be held liable for offenses against
international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide." (quoting the introductory note to
Pt. II of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1986)).
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whether Kadic and Doe, as private individuals, may bring claims under
the ATCA based on a violation of the law of nations. Instead, the
court discusses the ATCA's "law of nations" clause solely as a
jurisdictional requirement: "There is no federal subject-matter
jurisdictionunder the Alien Tort Act unless the complaint adequately
pleads a violation of the law of nations. ..."I By choosing not to
discuss the issue of individual rights under the law of nations, the
Second Circuit failed to address a crucial issue in modem ATCA
jurisprudence.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Individual Obligations in Karadzic
Although the Second Circuit's finding of jurisdiction over
Radovan Karadzic may be regarded as controversial, the court's
decision is well-supported by the standards of contemporary international law. In particular, contemporary international law supports two
important conclusions of the court: (1) individuals may have
obligations under international law, and (2) international law
prohibitions regarding genocide and war crimes currently extend to

individual non-state actors.
In evaluating whether the law of nations imposes obligations on
individuals, the court correctly looked to the history of both the law
of nations and the ATCA. 94 In examining the history of the law of
nations, the Karadziccourt discovered that individual non-state actors
95
could be liable for the ancient offenses of piracy and slave trade.
Historically, these two offenses were prosecuted under the doctrine of
hostis humani generis.96 This doctrine allowed for the prosecution of
"universally reprehensible" offenses, without regard to the nationality
of an individual defendant,97 often resulting in liability for the
individual non-state actor.98 Thus, in referring to the hostis humani
generis offenses of piracy and slave trade, Karadzic correctly found

93. Karazdic, 70 F.3d. at 238 (emphasis added).
94. See id. at 239-40.
95. Id. at 240.
96. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
97. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 18, at 61. According to the Supreme Court, "every
individual becomes punishable whatever may be his national character" under the hostis humani
generis doctrine. Id.(quoting United States v. Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 193 (1820)).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820); United States v.
Pirates, 18 U.S. 184; La Jeune Eugene, 26 F. Cas. 832 (D. Mass. 1821).
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precedent for non-state actor liability under the law of nations.
The Karadzic court also noted that precedent for non-state actor
liability exists under the ATCA. In particular, the court cited the
early cases of Bolchos and Adra as examples of cases in which
violations of the law of nations by private individuals gave rise to
jurisdiction under the ATCA.99 In both cases, the defendants were
non-state actors; the defendant in Bolchos was an agent of a private
British citizen who seized and sold a cargo of slaves,"0 and the
defendant in Adra was the ex-wife of a Lebanese ambassador.'01 In
citing these ATCA cases, the court found further precedent for its
conclusion that individual non-state actors have obligations under the
law of nations.
The court's second conclusion-that international prohibitions on
genocide and war crimes extend to individual non-state actors-is also
supported by considerable authority. Such support derives from the
rules of customary international law, a recognized source for determinations regarding the content of the law of nations."° The rules of
customary international law initially developed as non-binding
standards, which gained force over time through the "general usage
and practice of nations."'" Eventually, these standards ripened into
binding customary international law, when they began to reflect a
strong consensus on the part of the international community."°
In evaluating the status of the non-state actor under customary
international law, however, one key tenet must be held in mind:
customary international law defines not only what substantive
standards bind the international community, but also who can be
bound by such standards.0 5 In Filartiga,for example, the court held
that customary international law prohibits torture but only when such
I °6
torture is perpetrated under the color of official state authority.

99. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
102. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 18, at 58, 72-75.
103. UnitedStates v. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61; see also The PaqueteHabana,175 U.S. 677,700
(1899).
104. See Filartiga,670 F.2d at 881.
105. See Amerada Hess Shipping v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating
that customary international law dictates who falls within the jurisdictional grant of the ATCA);
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 884 (restricting the customary international law prohibition on torture only
to states and state actors); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95 (recognizing the customary international
law prohibition on torture by state actors but declining to extend it to non-state actors).
106. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 877.
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In articulating this limitation, the court concluded that it was
customary international law that defined which parties could be held
responsible for acts of torture. For example, the Filartigacourt cited
a U.N. declaration restricting the definition of torture to suffering that
is "intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official."'w

Likewise, Tel-Oren recognized that the prohibition on torture in
Filartigareflected an international consensus that only states and state
actors could be liable for torture. 8 Specifically, Judge Edwards
looked to customary international law to determine whether the
prohibition should apply to individual non-state actors:
The question therefore arises whether to stretch Filartiga'sreasoning
to incorporate torture perpetrated by a party other than a recognized state or one of its officials acting under color of state law ....
I do not believe the consensus on non-official torture warrants an
extension of Filartiga.'9

Although Judge Edwards declined to hold individual non-state actors
responsible for acts of torture, he did so because he believed that the
consensus of the international community prohibiting some forms of
torture did not include a consensus that individual non-state actors
should be subject to the prohibition."0 Even though Judge Edwards
and the court in Filartiga reached different conclusions regarding
jurisdiction, they did so on the basis of the same principle: customary
international law defines the substantive rule of law as well as who
may be bound by that rule.
This principle is central to the reasoning of Karadzic. As applied
in Karadzic, the principle dictates that international prohibitions on
genocide and war crimes apply to individual non-state actors only if
customary international law is found to include a specific consensus
that such individuals can be liable." Determining whether such a
consensus is part of customary international law is, however, a
complicated process. Because customary international law is defined
only by consensus, there exists a strict requirement that such consen-

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792-95.
Id. at 792, 795 (emphasis added).
See id. at 795.
See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 241.
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sus be extremely strong." In particular, ATCA cases have interpreted this requirement to mean that binding customary international
law may only be comprised of "universal, definable, and obligatory
international norms."1 3 In order to identify such norms, courts have
repeatedly looked to the recognized sources of international law,
which include the following: (1) international conventions, (2) the
usage of nations, (3) judicial decisions, and (4) the works of qualified
commentators." 4 By looking to several of these sources, the
Karadzic court concluded that individual non-state actors could be
held liable
for genocide and war crimes under customary international
5
law.1
In holding that individual non-state actors could be held liable for
genocide, the court looked primarily to one particular international
convention, the Genocide Convention, as a source of international
law."6 Specifically, the court noted that the Genocide Convention
provides that "[p]ersons committing genocide... shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionallyresponsible rulers,public officials or
private individuals.""7 Because this language comes from an
operative international convention, the court considered it to be an
especially strong statement of international law."' Such a conclusion
is supported by several factors. First, international conventions codify
international norms, making judicial decisions based on those norms
more feasible and appropriate." 9 Second, international conventions
are recognized as statements that accurately reflect the consensus of

112. See Filartiga,670 F.2d at 881.
113. Forti, 672 F. Supp at 1540.
114. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61; Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881 (quoting The
Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 38, 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1945)).
115. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 241-43.
116. Id. at 241-42. Although this discussion focuses on the Genocide Convention, the court
cited other evidence that non-state actors could be liable for genocide. In particular, the court
quoted from two United Nations General Assembly resolutions declaring that individuals could
be held responsible for the crime of genocide. Id. at 241.
117. Id. at 241 (quoting Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, entered into force January 12, 1951, for the United States Feb. 23, 1989, 78 U.N.T.S.
277, 280) (alteration in original).
118. See id. at 241 (noting that the Genocide Convention provides a specific articulation of
the prohibition of genocide in international law).
119. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792 ("[t]he greater the degree of codification or consensus
concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it .... ") (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 428 (1963)).
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the international community."W In Filartiga,for example, the court
characterized a U.N. declaration as "an authoritative statement of the
international community."''
In this way, the Genocide Convention
supports the court's conclusion that non-state actors may be liable for
genocide under customary international law."
Customary international law also provides support for the court's
conclusion that private individuals can be liable under the law of
nations for committing war crimes. Again, customary international
law governs not only what acts are punishable as war crimes, but,
more importantly in this case, who can be held accountable under
internati6nal law for such acts.'"
In addressing this issue, the
Karadzic court looked to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as the
relevant source of customary international law. 24 Specifically, the
court focused on common article 3, which governs "'armed conflict[s]
not of an international character' and binds 'each Party to the conflict
....
,,,M5 Although common article 3 does not explicitly mention
individuals, the court correctly concluded that private individuals may
be "parties to the conflict" under customary international law."
An analysis of common article 3 reveals that the court's conclusion is correct for three reasons. First, the court accurately cited the
Nuremberg Trials after World War II as a starting point for recognizing individual liability under international law."z The judgment of
the Nuremberg Tribunal included a statement recognizing the

existence of the individual in the plane of international law:

120. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 883.
121. Id. (quoting E. SC-VELB, HUMAN RIGHTs AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70

(1964)).
122. Note that the Genocide Convention is not directly binding as a treaty, but indirectly
binding because it is evidence of a norm of customary international law. In making this
distinction, the court is careful to state that it is determining whether the defendant violated
"well-established, universally recognized norms of international law." See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at
236. The court is using the Genocide Convention not as a direct source of law but as a source
of evidence that proves a customary norm of international law. For a more detailed discussion
on this distinction, see generally Joan Hartman, Enforcement of InternationalHuman Rights Law
in State and Federal Courts, 7 W TrER L. REv. 741, 747-751 (1985).
Of course, not all treaties are codifications of customary norms. In fact, some treaties may
be codifications of emerging rules that cut against established norms. In this case, however, the
court cites other sources of international law, which show that the Genocide Convention does
indeed reflect the prevailing norm. See supranote 116.
123. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 241; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
124. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
125. Id. at 243. (quoting common article 3).
126. See id.
127. See id.
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[C]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individualswho commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."'
By explicitly recognizing individual liability for war crimes, this
judgment indicated that future international law relating to war crimes,
such as common article 3,129 would also recognize individual liability.

Second, the court's conclusion is supported by the language of
common article 3. According to its text, common article 3 applies to
"armed conflicts not of an international character., 130 In other
words, common article 3 applies to internal conflicts-that is, to
conflicts where at least one of the "parties to the conflict" is almost
certainly a non-state actor, such as a belligerent in armed conflict
against a state. Because individual leaders are often held accountable
for war crimes committed by their subordinates, 131 individual nonstate actors could easily fall within the scope of common article 3.
Finally, the court's conclusion is supported by several authoritative sources of international law. For example, the U.S. government
noted in its Army Field Manual that individual non-state actors could
be liable for crimes under international law:
Any person, whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian,
who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international
law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. 32
According to all these sources of customary international law, common
article 3 applies to parties which are purely private individuals. For
this reason, the Karadzic court correctly cited common article 3 as
strong evidence that individual non-state actors may be held responsi128. Blum & Steinhardt, supranote 18, at 68 (emphasis added) (quoting the Judgment of the
International Military Tribunal, 22 Trial ofthe Major War CriminalsBefore the InternationalMilitary Tribunal Proceedings 411, 465-66 (1948)).
129. Note that as part of the Geneva Conventions, common article 3 was first adopted in
1949, just shortly after the judgment of the Nuremburg Tribunal was handed down in 1948. See
supra text accompanying note 124.
130. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 243; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, for the United States Feb. 2, 1956, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
131. See, eg., U.S. DEP'T. OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 498, at 178, 11
509-10, at 182-83 (Field Manual 27-10, 1956) [hereinafter LAND WARFARE]; Captain Jordan J.
Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and LeaderResponsibility, 57 MIL L. REV. 99,175-85
(1972).
132. LAND WARFARE, supra note 131, 498, at 178; see also Paust, supra note 131, at 167
(discussing individual liability under the laws of armed conflict for complicitous conduct).
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ble for war crimes under customary international law.
In holding that individual non-state actors could be liable under
the ATCA for genocide and war crimes committed in violation of the
law of nations, Karadzic seems to have expanded the reach of the
ATCA as earlier outlined in Filartiga. Karadzic, however, might be
read not as an extension, but rather as an application, of Filartiga.
The court in Filartigaheld that individual state actors could be liable
for torture under the ATCA because customary international law
included a consensus regarding who could be liable for torture: states
and official state actors. This principle is the same as the one applied
in Karadzic, specifically that customary international law defines not
only what substantive standards bind the international community, but
also who can be bound by such standards. 133 Because customary
international law includes a consensus that individual non-state actors
can be held responsible for genocide and war crimes, the Karadzic
court correctly held that the defendant, as a private individual, may
have violated the law of nations, thereby triggering jurisdiction under
the ATCA.
B. Individual Rights in Karadzic
In holding that the law of nations imposes obligations on private
individuals, Karadzic is supported by substantial historical and modem
authority. Karadzic stands on much less stable ground, however, in its
assumption that private individuals can enforce rights under the
ATCA that are based on violations of the law of nations. As
discussed above, the weight of authority indicates that the law of
nations does not confer substantive rights upon individuals."3
Despite this authority, it is a separate question whether individuals are provided with a private right of action by the ATCA. On this
point, the history of the ATCA is mixed. Although early ATCA cases
like Moxon and Bolchos never questioned the ability of private
individuals to sue under the ATCA, 35 some modem ATCA cases,
most notably Tel-Oren, have addressed this issue and concluded that
the ATCA6 does not create a private right of action for individual
3
plaintiffs.
133. See Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 241.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
136. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Jones, 722 F. Supp at 348 (section 1350
merely serves as an entrance into the federal courts and in no way provides a cause of action to
any plaintiff); Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 28 ("Section 1350 ...[does] not create a cause of action for a
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In Tel-Oren, Judge Bork raised an argument with the potential for
undermining the ATCA as a tool for litigating human rights violations.137 In short, Judge Bork argued that individual plaintiffs cannot
sue for human rights violations because neither the law of nations nor
3
the ATCA provides individuals with a private right of action.1 1
Judge Bork's reasoning may be summarized in five steps. First, Judge
Bork recognizes a distinction between jurisdiction and cause of
action. 9 Second, he argues that no plaintiff can sustain a claim
based on international law without an express or implied cause of
action."4 Third, he notes that international law, whether based on
treaties or on the law of nations, generally does not supply individual
plaintiffs with a cause of action. 1' Fourth, he argues that no cause
of action is expressly provided in the ATCA,' 42 and neither should
one be implied.'43 Finally, Judge Bork concludes that without a
cause of action, individual plaintiffs are rendered unable to sue for
human rights violations under the ATCA.'"
If this argument is left unaddressed, there are several reasons why
it may successfully be used to undermine the effect of the result in
Karadzic. First, the cause of action issue is likely to attract the
attention of the Supreme Court because it reflects a significant split
between the circuits. In Karadzic, the Second Circuit allows the
ATCA to be used expansively without addressing the cause of action
issue.'45 On the other hand, Tel-Oren, decided by the D.C. Circuit,
allows the ATCA to be used by private individuals only in the rarest
of circumstances.' 6 Second, Judge Bork's view of the ATCA, if
unchallenged, may be preferred by the Supreme Court because it is
consistent with the Court's current presumption against implying

plaintiff seeking recovery under a treaty").
137. See supra text accompanying note 75. One commentator openly acknowledges that
Judge Bork's "cause of action" rationale poses a "serious barrier" to litigation of international
human rights violations in federal courts. Hartman, supra note 122, at 749.
138. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799, 801.
139. See id. at 799-801.
140. See id. at 801 ("it is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause of action before
a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal.").
141. Id. at 816 ("International law today does not provide plaintiffs with a cause of action.").
142. Id. at 801 ("[A]ppellants have not been granted a cause of action by federal statute...
143. Id. at 822 ("[I]t is improper for judges to infer a private cause of action not explicitly
granted.").
144. Id. at 801.
145. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232.
146. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774.
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causes of action under federal statutes in the absence of clear
congressional intent.'4 7
Despite the potential impact of Judge Bork's Tel-Oren argument,
the court in Karadzic never addressed the cause of action issue.
Should the issue be taken up by the Supreme Court, this omission
could undermine both the Karadzic decision and the future of the
ATCA. This danger, however, could have been avoided. Indeed,
several arguments, which might have been identified in Karadzic,are
available to refute the conclusion reached by Judge Bork in TelIn particular, the implication of a private right of action in
Oren.'
the ATCA might be justified by two key factors: the intent of
Congress in 1789 and the intent of Congress today.
1. Implication is Justified by the Intent of Congress in 1789. In
determining whether a cause of action should be implied under a
federal statute, courts have always considered congressional intent to
be a significant factor.'49 In recent years, congressional intent seems
to have gained greater significance among the courts.'50 In determining congressional intent, the Supreme Court routinely looks to
several specific factors, including consideration of the class of plaintiffs
who were the intended beneficiaries of the statute.'5 1 In evaluating
the original intent of the Congress of 1789 in this case, the key
question is whether the Congress intended for private individuals to
be among the class of plaintiffs benefitted by the ATCA.
Despite the lack of available legislative history, the class of
plaintiffs that Congress intended to benefit from the ATCA can be

147. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (1985) (stating that the judiciary should

not imply a remedy that Congress did not intend to provide); National Ass'n of Counties v.
Baker 842 F.2d 369 (1988) (holding that a right to recover under a federal statute is not to be
implied in the absence of clear congressional intent).

148. Only a critique of the fourth step in Judge Bork's analysis, that no private right of action
should be implied in the ATCA, will be discussed in detail here. Another commentator has

suggested that the first step in Bork's argument, his assumption that the modem distinction
between jurisdiction and cause of action should apply to the ATCA, is also open to attack. See
D'Amato, supra note 14, at 94-105.
149. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1974).

150.

See Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1983); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S.

174, 191-91 (1988) (indicating a preference that Congress, rather than the courts, determine

whether private rights of action should be available under federal statutes).
151. See Daily, 464 U.S. 523. Whereas legislative history is usually the most helpful factor
in evaluating legislative intent, the legislative history of the ATCA is completely unavailable.
See, eg., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812 ("The debates over the Judiciary Act in the House-the
Senate debates were not recorded-nowhere mention the provision, not even, so far as we are

aware, indirectly.").
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best identified by looking at the early ATCA cases. As discussed
above, the plaintiffs in two of the earliest ATCA cases, Moxon and
Bolchos, were unquestionably private individuals. 152 Because both
of these cases were litigated within six years of Congress' enactment
of the ATCA,' 3 they provide strong evidence that Congress intended that the ATCA be used to the benefit of private individuals.
Some might object to this conclusion, arguing that these cases
actually flouted congressional intent. Such an objection, however,
ignores the fact that Congress did not change the ATCA in reaction
to Moxon and Bolchos, 4 which clearly involved individual plainGiven this lack of congressional reaction, one must conclude
tiffs.'
that Congress permitted, and may have intended, that the ATCA be
used to the benefit of individual plaintiffs.
Such a conclusion might be challenged from a different angle on
grounds supplied by Judge Bork in his Tel-Oren opinion. While
arguing against the existence of a private right of action in international law, Judge Bork acknowledges that an exception was created in The
5 6 where the Supreme Court assumed the existence
Paquete Habana"
of a private right of action. 57 Judge Bork distinguishes this exception, however, by explaining that The Paquete Habana involved a
special category of international law-prize jurisdiction under
maritime law-which was unique in its recognition of a private right
of action for an individual plaintiff' 58 Applying Judge Bork's
explanation to Moxon and Bolchos, one might further argue that
Congress viewed these cases merely as applications of this special
category of maritime law prize jurisdiction.5 9
This argument assumes, however, that the Congress of the 1790's
was concerned with the existence of a cause of action."6 The notion
of "causes of action," however, surfaced only in 1848, more than fifty
152. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 45-46.
154. The ATCA has been changed only in phraseology and not in substance. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350.

155. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73.
156. 175 U.S. 677.
157. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816 n.24.
158. See Id.
159. As in The Paquete Habana,both Moxon and Bolchus involved the capture of a ship or
the seizure of its cargo. See supratext accompanying notes 47-48, 69-71.
160. The steps of the argument might be as follows: (1) Congress requires that a cause of
action exist in all cases, (2) international law does not generally provide individuals with a cause
of action, and (3) Congress, in this case, has recognized that an individual does have a cause of
action because of the maritime prize jurisdiction exception.
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years after the early ATCA cases.' 6' Therefore, in evaluating
Moxon and Bolchus, Congress would have been utterly unaware of the
need for a "cause of action," as the term is understood today.
Because Judge Bork's Tel-Oren argument rests on the modem
notion of a cause of action, it has no bearing on the intent of Congress
in 1789. Moreover, the issue is not whether Congress intended the
ATCA to create a private cause of action, but, rather, whether
Congress intended the ATCA to benefit a class of plaintiffs that
included private individuals. 62 According to the early ATCA cases,
the Congress of 1789 did allow the ATCA to be used for the benefit
of private individual plaintiffs.
2. Implication is Justified by the Intent of Congress Today. In
addition to the intent of Congress at the time of the passage of the
ATCA in 1789, the intent of the modem Congress should also be
considered in attempting to imply a private right of action under the
ATCA. Although the modem Congress' view of the ATCA may
differ greatly from that of the 1789 Congress, it remains relevant in
construing the ATCA because of the Supreme Court's preference that
decisions regarding implied rights of action be made not by the courts
but by Congress."6' Although Congress has issued no direct statements regarding this particular issue, congressional intent may be
inferred from the reaction of Congress to modem cases in which
private individuals have brought suit under the ATCA.
As discussed above, the modem era of the ATCA began in
earnest with the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga.'64 The court
in Filartiga,however, never discussed the existence of a private right
of action."6 Instead, the court allowed Dolly and Joel Filartiga to
sue as individual plaintiffs, apparently assuming that a private right of
action was implied in the ATCA.'6 Following Filartiga, several
ATCA cases, including Karadzic, took the same approach and

161. D'Amato, supranote 14, at 95. Apparently, the phrase "cause of action" became a term
of art in 1848 as part of the legal reform that abolished the distinction between law and equity.
See id.
162. See supra text accompanying note 151.
163. See supranote 150 and accompanying text.
164. See supratext accompanying note 57.
165. See Filartiga,630 F.2d 876.
166. See Id. at 880. Obviously, the Filartiga court would be aware of the established principle
that international law provides no private right of action for individuals. See supranote 141 and
accompanying text. Because the court allowed the suit to go forward, it must have assumed that
if a private right of action was needed, such a right was implied in the ATCA.
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assumed without discussion that a private right of action is implied in
the ATCA. 67
In the wake of Filartiga and its progeny, congressional reaction
has indicated nothing but approval for private suits under the ATCA.
In fact, instead of restricting the scope of the ATCA by excluding
private plaintiffs, Congress affirmed, and perhaps even expanded the
availability of private use of the ATCA by codifying Filartiga and
extending its protection to U.S. citizens under the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA).'"
In the TVPA, Congress reinforced
Filartiga'sholding by imposing civil liability on state actors who
engage in torture or extrajudicial killing. 69 Moreover, Congress
clearly established that such actions could be brought by private
individuals: "An individual who.., subjects an individual to torture
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."70
In addition to the language of the TVPA, the legislative history
of the act illustrates that Congress expressly intended to provide a
private right of action for individuals. First, the House Report notes
Judge Bork's criticism of Filartiga,and then explicitly states that the
TVPA was enacted to quell such criticism and ensure the availability
of a private right of action for official torture:
The Filartigacase met with general approval. At least one Federal
judge, however, questioned whether section 1350 [the ATCA] can
be used by victims of torture committed in foreign nations absent
an explicit grant of a cause of action [citing Tel-Oren] . ... The
TVPA would provide such a grant .... 1

Besides responding to Judge Bork's criticism, the TVPA's legislative

167. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("There appears to
be a growing consensus that [section] 1350 provides a cause of action for certain ' international
common law torts"'); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995) (Noting that a
majority of courts have held that "[section] 1350 grants both a federal private cause of action as
well as a federal forum in which to assert the claim"); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Section 1350 does not require that the
action Iarise under' the law of nations, but only mandates a ' violation of the law of nations' in
order to create a cause of action") (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring));
Paul v. Avril, 812 F.Supp. 207, 211 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
168. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256,106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350) [hereinafter TVPA]. The TVPA is appended to the ATCA.
169. See TVPA supra note 168, § 2.
170. Id. § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
171. H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3-4 (1992), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
84, 86.
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history also demonstrates congressional support for private rights of
action by extending the reach of the TVPA to U.S. citizens:
[The TVPA] would also enhance the remedy already available
under section 1350 in an important respect: While the Alien Tort
Claims Act provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA would
extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens ....
As used in this passage, "citizens" must have been meant to include
private individuals. Because the civil remedy under the ATCA is
available only to "aliens," such as the individual plaintiffs in
Filartiga,73 the expansion of this remedy under the TVPA to include
"U.S. citizens" could only have been intended to cover a similar class
of private plaintiffs.
Thus, as indicated by both the language and the legislative history
of the TVPA, congressional reaction to Filartiga'sinterpretation of the
ATCA was anything but hostile. On the contrary, Congress codified
the individual's right of action presumed to exist in Filartiga,responded directly to Judge Bork's call for an explicit grant of a cause of
action, and extended Filartiga'sprotection to citizens of the U.S. as
private individuals. In light of this response, it would appear that
implying a private right of action under the ATCA is fully supported
by the intent of Congress today.
In opposition to this evidence favoring implication of a private
right of action in the ATCA, some might argue that the modem
Congress has consistently taken pains to ensure that individuals do not
have rights of action based on international human rights treaties. 174
When ratifying such treaties, it has become regular practice for the
Senate to include a special provision 75 declaring that the United

172. Id. at 86.
173. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878 (noting that the plaintiffs are citizens of the Republic of

Paraguay).
174. For example, in adopting legislation to implement the Genocide Convention, Congress
included the following provision: "[N]or shall anything in this chapter be construed as creating
any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any proceeding." 18
U.S.C.A. § 1092 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). This implementing provision prevents private
individuals from directly enforcing the Genocide Convention in U.S. courts.

175. These provisions are generally grouped into four categories: reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos. Whereas reservations usually contradict the obligations of a
treaty, the other provisions usually function only to interpret the obligations of a treaty. All of
the provisions, however, are significant in interpreting the congressional intent related to
ratification. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 Cm.-KENT L. RaV. 571, 585 (1991).
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States considers the substantive provisions of the treaty to be non-selfexecuting.'76 If a treaty is termed non-self-executing, a private
individual cannot use the treaty as a binding rule of law in U.S.
courts. 7 Hence, the congressional practice of declaring human
rights treaties to be non-self-executing prevents private individuals
from directly enforcing rights under such treaties.
From here, it might be argued that because Congress prevents
individuals from enforcing rights under treaties, it would be inconsistent for Congress to allow individuals to enforce the same rights under
the law of nations. That, however, is precisely what Congress has
done. With regard to official torture, for example, Congress prohibited individual enforcement of the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Torture Convention). 78 In ratifying the Torture Convention, the
Senate included a declaration that Articles 1 through 16 of the
convention were not self-executing.'79 By rendering the Torture
Convention non-self-executing, Congress prevented private individuals
from directly asserting claims for official torture under this treaty.
Meanwhile, however, Congress explicitly affirmed the private
individual's right to sue for official torture as a violation of the law of
nations." Congress affirmed this right when it enacted the TVPA,
codifying the holding of Filartiga and providing a private right of
action for official torture committed in violation of the law of
nations."
The above example demonstrates that congressional intent
regarding treaties is not necessarily determinative of congressional
intent regarding the law of nations. In fact, Congress has good reason

176. See Lori F. Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing"
and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CH.-KENT L. REV. 515 (1991).
177. This is an application of the famous principle established in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S.
253 (1829), that only self-executing treaties may be relied upon for the enforcement of private
rights. See also Hartman, supra note 122, at 742 (explaining that a self-executing treaty can be
used as a binding rule of law, whereas a non-self-executing treaty cannot be used as a binding
rule, unless Congress has adopted implementing legislation, allowing the treaty to be used as a
substantive rule of law).
178. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signatureDec. 10,1984, enteredintoforce June 26,1987, G.A. Res. 39/46,

U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 93d plen. mtg. at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984);
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 175, at 631. The torture convention is a multi-lateral treaty
prohibiting official torture.
179. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 175, at 631.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 168-173.
181. See id.
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to distinguish between individual rights based on treaties and
individual rights based on the law of nations. On one hand, treaties
are concerned with obligations between the parties to the treaty, which
are by definition not individuals, but nations."8 Were individuals
permitted to assert their rights based on treaties, the undesirable sideeffect of interference with the obligations of the nations involved
might result."8 Congress prevents such interference by explicitly
declaring that all new treaties, such as the Torture Convention, are
non-self-executing, and therefore unenforceable by individuals.
The law of nations, on the other hand, may be enforced by
individuals without any danger of resultant interference with national
obligations. Unlike treaties, the law of nations does not involve
obligations that have been negotiated between specific parties."8 As
a result, individual suits do not interfere with the obligations of any
party, and Congress has no strong desire to prevent individual claims
based on the law of nations.
In light of this distinction between treaty law and the law of
nations, the behavior of Congress demonstrates consistent support for
the enforcement of individual rights under the ATCA. Although
Congress has prevented individuals from asserting rights based on
treaties, it has done so to prevent interference with its own treatybased obligations. Congress' enactment of the TVPA, on the other
hand, confirms that the modern Congress explicitly supports, and even
encourages, ATCA claims by private individuals.
Through its reaction to ATCA cases, both in 1789 and more
recently, Congress has consistently shown that it intends the ATCA
to benefit private individuals as a class of plaintiffs. Because
congressional intent is the key factor in determining whether to imply
a right of action in the ATCA, courts, such as the Second Circuit in
Karadzic,should not duck the cause of action issue raised in Tel-Oren,
but should openly acknowledge that a private right of action is implied
in the ATCA.
V. CONCLUSION
In holding that Radovan Karadzic, as a non-state actor, violated

182. See, ag., D'Amato, supranote 14, at 99.
183. See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 323 (1992).
184. See Forti,672 F. Supp. at 1540. Instead, customary international law dictates that legal
norms must be "universal, definite, and obligatory" in order to be part of the law of nations. I&
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international law, and that private individuals may bring suit under the
ATCA to redress such violations, the Second Circuit seemed to be
standing on controversial ground. Although the result in Karadzic
may at first seem controversial, the court's reasoning is really only an
illustration of previously established principles.
In acknowledging that non-state actors may be found liable under
international law, Karadzic seems to extend Filartiga,which limited
individual liability for official torture to state actors. Both cases,
however, are based on the same principle: customary international
law defines not only the substantive offense but also who may be
liable for that offense. Whereas customary international law holds
only state actors liable for torture, it provides that individual non-state
actors may be liable for offenses such as genocide and war crimes.
Because Karadzic was alleged to have perpetrated both genocide and
war crimes, the court sustained jurisdiction over him as an individual
non-state actor.
Likewise, in assuming that individual rights may be vindicated
under the ATCA, regardless of the absence of an explicitly provided
private right of action in international law, Karadzic followed an
established practice in ATCA jurisprudence. Despite the historical
practice of allowing ATCA suits by private individuals, the existence
of a private right of action in the ATCA has remained a controversial
matter. This controversy, however, could have been essentially settled
by the Second Circuit. By demonstrating how congressional intent
favors suits by private individuals under the ATCA, Karadzic might
have openly implied a private right of action in the statute, thereby
laying a more solid foundation for the vindication of individual human
rights under the ATCA.
David P. Kunstle

